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Abstract—We present SeLoC: a relational separation logic for
verifying non-interference of fine-grained concurrent programs
in a compositional way. SeLoC is more expressive than previous
approaches, both in terms of the features of the target program-
ming language, and in terms of the logic. The target programming
language supports dynamically allocated references (pointers),
higher-order functions, and fine-grained fork-based concurrency
with low-level atomic operators like compare-and-set. The logic
provides an invariant mechanism to establish protocols on data
that is not protected by locks. This allows us to verify programs
that were beyond the reach of previous approaches.
A key technical innovation in SeLoC is a relational version of
weakest preconditions to track information flow using separation
logic resources. On top of these weakest preconditions we build
a type system-like abstraction, using invariants and logical rela-
tions. SeLoC has been mechanized on top of the Iris framework
in the Coq proof assistant.
Index Terms—non-interference, fine-grained concurrency, in-
variants, logical relations, separation logic, Coq, Iris
I. INTRODUCTION
Non-interference is a form of information flow control (IFC)
used to express security properties like confidentiality and
secrecy, which guarantee that confidential information does
not leak to attackers. In order to establish non-interference of
programs used in practice, it is necessary to develop techniques
that scale up to programming paradigms and programming
constructs found in modern programming languages. Much
effort has been put into that direction—e.g., to support dy-
namically allocated references and higher-order functions [1]–
[3], and concurrency [4]–[10]. For shared-memory concur-
rency a lot of these efforts were focused on compositional
reasoning, which is needed to facilitate reasoning about com-
ponents/threads in isolation without having to take all possible
interference from the environment and other threads into
account. Despite recent advancements, the expressivity of
available techniques for non-interference still lags behind the
expressivity of techniques for functional correctness, which
have seen major breakthroughs since the seminal development
of concurrent separation logic [11], [12]. There are several
reasons for this:
• As pointed out in [6], for many interesting program mod-
ules, non-interference relies on functional correctness. For
example, it may be the case that the confidentiality of the
contents of a reference depends on runtime information
instead of mere static information (this is called value-
dependent classification).
• Proving non-interference is harder than proving func-
tional correctness. While functional correctness is a prop-
erty about each single run of a program, non-interference
is stated in terms of multiple runs of the same program.
One has to show that for different values of confidential
inputs, the attacker cannot observe a different behavior.
Another reason for the discrepancy between the lack of
expressiveness for techniques for non-interference compared
to those for functional correctness is that a lot of prior work
on non-interference has focused on type systems and type
system-like logics, e.g., [1], [4], [6], [9], [10]. Such systems
have the benefit of providing strong automation (by means of
type checking), but lack capabilities to reason about functional
correctness, and therefore to establish non-interference of more
challenging programs.
In order to overcome aforementioned shortcomings, we take
a different and more expressive approach that combines the
power of type systems and concurrent separation logic. In
our approach, one assigns flexible interfaces to individual
program modules using types. The program modules can then
be composed using typing rules, ensuring non-interference
of the whole system. Individual programs can be verified
against those interfaces using a relational concurrent separation
logic, which allows one to carry out non-interference proofs
intertwined with functional correctness proofs.
Although ideas from concurrent separation logic have been
employed for establishing non-interference (for first-order pro-
grams) before, see [9], [10], we believe that the combination
of typing and separation logic is new. On top of that, our
approach provides a number of other advantages compared to
prior work on non-interference:
• We are the first to consider non-interference in the context
of a language with fine-grained concurrency. That is,
our language features low-level atomic operations like
compare-and-set. These operations are used to implement
lock-free concurrent data structures and high-level syn-
chronization mechanisms like locks/mutexes, whereas in
prior work locks were taken to be language primitives.
• To provide a high level of expressiveness and modular-
ity, our separation logic involves various novel features.
First, to support reasoning about multiple runs of a
program with different values for confidential inputs, our
separation logic is relational. Second, to reason about
sophisticated forms of sharing and ownership, as in value-
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dependent classifications, our logic provides a powerful
invariant mechanism to describe expressive protocols.
In order to build our logic we make use of the Iris frame-
work for concurrent separation logic [13]–[16], which provides
basic building blocks, including the invariant mechanism. To
combine typing and separation logic, we follow recent work
on logical relations [17]–[19], [24], [25], but apply it to non-
interference instead of functional correctness or contextual
refinement.
Contributions:
• We introduce SeLoC, the first logic for non-interference
that supports fine-grained concurrency, higher-order func-
tions, and dynamic (higher-order) references (§ III-A). It
is sound w.r.t. a standard notion of non-interference—
probabilistic non-interference of Sabelfeld and Sands
[5]—which is applicable to many schedulers (§ III-B).
• We show that SeLoC, which features a relational version
of weakest preconditions, is expressive enough to verify
non-interference of fine-grained concurrent lock-free ex-
amples relying on specific protocols (§ IV).
• We show that SeLoC supports compositional reasoning
through an information-flow aware type system that can
compose proofs of program modules. This type system
is defined as an abstraction on top of SeLoC (§V).
• We show that SeLoC supports compositional reasoning
throughmodular specifications of program modules. Such
specifications can be used to establish non-interference of
clients without having to re-verify the implementation of
the program module (§VI).
• We use a novel technique for constructing a bisimulation
out of a closed SeLoC proof to prove soundness (§VII).
• We have mechanized SeLoC, its type system, its sound-
ness proof, and all examples in the paper and appendix,
in the Coq proof assistant (§ VIII). The mechanization
can be found online at [20].
II. MOTIVATING EXAMPLES
Before proceeding with the formal development of the paper
in § III, we first provide two sample programs to identify
challenging aspects, demonstrate the expressivity of SeLoC,
and to motivate the design choices we made.
A. Fine-grained concurrency
Consider the program prog in Figure 1 (written in an ML-
like language), which is a lock-free version of a similar lock-
based program in [10]. It runs two threads in parallel, both of
which operate on a reference r .data . The data in this reference
has a value-dependent classification: the value of the flag
r .is classified determines the sensitivity of r .data . If the flag
r .is classified is set to false, then the data stored in r .data is
classified with low-sensitivity (i.e., publicly observable), and if
it is set to true, the the data is classified with high-sensitivity
(i.e., confidential). The record r initially contains confidential
data from the integer variable secret . The first thread thread1
checks if the record r is classified (i.e., the flag r .is classified
let rec thread1 out r = (if ¬ ! r .is classified
then out ← ! r .data else ());
thread1 out r
let thread2 r = r .data ← 0;
r .is classified ← false
let prog out secret = let r =
{
data = ref(secret);
is classified = ref(true)
}
in thread1 out r || thread2 r
Figure 1. Lock-free value-dependent classification.
is true), and if it is not, it leaks the data r .data to an attacker-
observable channel out . The second thread thread2 overwrites
the data stored in r and resets the classification flag.
Due to the precise interplay of the two threads, the program
prog is secure, in the sense that it does not leak the data secret
onto the public channel out . Since our example does not use
locks, there are more possible interleavings than in the original
example in [10], and consequently there are more things that
could potentially go wrong in thread1 :
1) the data r .data can still be classified even if the bit
r .is classified is set to false;
2) the classification of the data stored in r might change
between reading the field is classified and reading the
actual data from the field data .
Notice that if we replace the second thread by the expression
below where the two operations in thread2 has been swapped,
then we would violate the first condition:
let thread2 bad r = r .is classified ← false;
r .data ← 0
To verify that both of these situations cannot occur, we have
to establish a protocol on accessing the record r . The protocol
should ensure that at the moment of reading r .is classified
the data r .data has the correct classification (ruling out
situation 1). The protocol should also ensure a form of
monotonicity: whenever the classification becomes low (i.e.,
r .is classified becomes false), r .data is not going to contain
high-sensitivity data for the rest of the program (ruling out
situation 2).
The security of thread1 , and the whole program, depends
on the specific protocol attached to the record r and that the
protocol is followed by all the components that operate on it.
In particular, for this example the security depends on the fact
that classification only changes in a monotone way.
B. Higher-order functions and dynamic references
Consider the following program awk , a variation of the
“awkward example” of Pitts and Stark [21]:
let awk v = let x = ref(v) in λ f. x← 1; f(); !x
When applied to a value v, the program awk returns a closure
that, when invoked, always returns low-sensitivity data from
2
the reference x, even if the original value v has high-sensitivity.
Intuitively, awk v returns a closure that does not leak any data,
even if the original value v passed to awk had high-sensitivity.
The lack of leaks crucially relies on the following facts:
• The reference x is allocated in and remains local to
the closure, it cannot be accessed without invoking the
closure;
• The reference x can be updated only in a monotone way:
once the original value v gets overwritten with 1, the
reference x never holds a high-sensitivity value again.
To see why second condition is important, consider awk bad ,
which violates the monotonicity, and is thus not secure:
let awk bad v = let x = ref(v) in
λ f. x← v;x← 1; f(); !x
Let h = awkbad v for a high-sensitivity value v. Now, when
running h (λx. fork {h(id)}), an attacker could influence the
scheduler so that the first dereference !x happens just after
the assignment x ← v in the forked-off thread, causing v to
leak.
Pitts and Stark studied this “awkward example” to motivate
the difficulties of reasoning about state in the presence of
higher-order functions. They were interested in contextual
equivalence, but as we can see, the same considerations are
also relevant for the study of non-interference.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section we describe the programming language that
we consider in this paper (§ III-A), and the non-interference
property that SeLoC establishes (§ III-B).
A. Object language and scheduler semantics
SeLoC is defined over an ML-like programming language,
called HeapLang, with higher-order mutable references, recur-
sion, the fork operation, and atomic compare-and-swap CAS.
HeapLang is the default programming language that is shipped
with Iris [22]. Its values and expressions are:
v ∈ Val ::= rec f x = e | (v1, v2) | true | false | . . .
e, s, t ∈ Expr ::= x | rec f x = e | e1(e2) | fork {e}
| ref(e) | ! e | e1 ← e2 | CAS(e1, e2, e3) | . . .
We omit the usual operations on pairs, sums, and integers.
We use the following syntactic sugar: (λx. e) , (rec x = e),
(let x = e1 in e2) , ((λx. e2) e1), and (e1; e2) , (let =
e1 in e2). The language has no primitive syntax for records,
so we model them using pairs.
HeapLang features dynamic thread creation, so we can
implement the parallel composition operation using fork:
let rec join x = match !xwith Some(v)→ v
| None→ join x
let par (f1, f2) = let x = ref(None) in
fork {x← Some(f1())}
let v2 = f2() in (join x, v2)
e1 || e2 , par (λ . e1, λ . e2)
The operational semantics of HeapLang is split into three
parts: thread-local head reductions→h, thread-local reductions
→t, and thread-pool reductions −→tp.
The thread-local head reductions are of the form
(e1, σ1) →h (e2, σ2), where each ei is an expression and
each σi is a heap, i.e., a finite map from locations to values
(State , Loc
fin
−⇀ Val). To make the thread-local reductions
deterministic, we parameterize the operational semantics by
an allocation oracle A : State→ Loc: a function from heaps
to locations satisfying A(σ) 6∈ σ. The thread-local reductions
have to be deterministic for the resulting thread-pool semantics
to be sound (to form a Markov process). With the allocation
oracle, the allocation head reduction is as follows:
(ref(v), σ)→h (A(σ), σ [A(σ)← v])
The other rules for the head reduction relation are standard
and can be found in the Coq formalization.
Thread-local head reductions are lifted to thread-local re-
ductions using call-by-value evaluation contexts:
K ∈ ECtx ::= [ • ] | K(v2) | e1(K) | ifK then e1 else e2 | . . .
Thread-local reductions are of the form (e1, σ1) →t (~e2, σ2).
The second component contains a list ~e2 of expressions to
accommodate forked-off threads as in STEP-FORK:
STEP-LIFT
(e1, σ1)→h (e2, σ2)
(K[ e1 ], σ1)→t (K[ e2 ], σ2)
STEP-FORK
~e = K[ () ] e
(K[ fork {e} ], σ)→t (~e, σ)
The thread-pool reduction relation −→tp is defined on config-
urations (~e, σ). The reductions between the configurations are
constructed in accordance with a probabilistic scheduler. We
adapt the definition from [5]. A probabilistic scheduler picks
the next thread to step based on the number of the active
threads and the execution history. Unlike the schedulers in
[5], for simplicity we do not allow a scheduler to depend on
the “low part” of the state, but we allow for a scheduler to
depend on the history of the execution.
Formally, a history H ∈ Hist is a list of pairs of natural
numbers (i,m), where m is the total number of the threads in
the thread pool at a point in the history, and i is the last active
thread at that point. For all consecutive pairs (i,m)(j, n) we
require j < m ≤ n. For a history, the number of live threads
is the size of the thread pool at the last moment in the history:
live(ǫ) , 1 live(H(i,m)) , m
A scheduler ρ is a dependently-typed function:
ρ :
∏
(H : Hist),D({0, . . . , live(H)− 1})
where D(X) is a set of probability distributions on a set X .
Finally, thread-pool reductions for a scheduler ρ are ob-
tained by lifting thread-local reductions using a scheduler ρ:
(ei, σ1)→t (e
′
i~u, σ2) H2 = H1(i, n+ |~u|)
(H1, e0 . . . ei . . . en, σ1)
ρ(H1,i)
−−−−−→tp (H2, e0 . . . e
′
i~u . . . en, σ2)
Here ρ(H, i) represents the probability of i-th thread firing
giving the history H . We write (H1, ~e1, σ1) −→tp (H2, ~e2, σ2)
for ∃p > 0. (H1, ~e1, σ1)
p
−→tp (H2, ~e2, σ2).
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B. Probabilistic non-interference
To state the soundness of SeLoC, we adapt a well-
established security condition known as scheduler specific
probabilistic bisimulation by Sabelfeld and Sands [5], which
is a timing-sensitive notion of non-interference for concurrent
programs.
We define =ρ, expressing that histories are indistinguish-
able for a scheduler ρ, as the greatest relation satisfying:
H1 =ρ H2
H1(i,m) =ρ H2(i,m)
H1 =ρ H2
∀i. ρ(H1, i) = ρ(H2, i)
We fix a set L ⊆ Loc of output locations, which we assume
to be low-sensitivity observable locations. For simplicity, we
require these locations to contain integers. We write σ1 ∼L σ2
when σ1 and σ2 are low-equivalent, i.e., they agree on all the
L-locations: ∀ℓ ∈ L. σ1(ℓ) = σ2(ℓ) 6= ⊥ ∧ σ1(ℓ) ∈ Z.
Definition 1. Given a scheduler ρ, a ρ-specific probabilistic
bisimulation is a partial equivalence relation R on configura-
tions such that:
1) If (~e, σ1) R (~e′, σ2), then σ1 ∼L σ2.
2) If (v1~e, σ1) R (v2~s, σ2), then v1 = v2.
3) If (~e, σ1) R (~s, σ2), then for all H1, H2 with H1 =ρ H2,
and for all H ′1, ~e
′, σ′1 with (H1, ~e, σ1) −→tp (H
′
1, ~e
′, σ′1)
there exists a H ′2, ~s
′, and σ′2 such that:
a) (H2, ~s, σ2) −→tp (H ′2, ~s
′, σ′2), and H
′
1 =ρ H
′
2, and
(~e′, σ′1) R (~s
′, σ′2);
b)
∑
{p | (H1, ~e, σ1)
p
−→tp (H,~t, σ) ∧
H =ρ H
′
1 ∧ (~t, σ) R (~e
′, σ′1)} =∑
{p | (H2, ~s, σ2)
p
−→tp (H,~t, σ) ∧
H =ρ H
′
2 ∧ (~t, σ) R (~s
′, σ′2)}
where the summation is done over multisets.
The locations from the set L of output locations are assumed
to be observable by the attacker. To model the input/high-
sensitivity data we use free variables. For simplicity we assume
that the input data also consists of integers. We then arrive at
the following top-level definition of security.
Definition 2 (Security). Let e be an expression with free
variables ~x. We say that e is secure, if for any scheduler ρ,
any heap σ with σ ∼L σ, and any sequences of integers ~i,
~j with |~i| = |~j| = |~x|, there exists a ρ-specific probabilistic
bisimulation R such that (e[~i/~x], σ) R (e[~j/~x], σ).
C. Non-determinism and non-interference
The semantics presented in § III-A is deterministic on the
thread-local level. Although we have not investigated how to
modify the semantics and the security condition to account for
non-determinism on a per-thread level, we can still account
for non-determinism arising from a scheduler. Consider the
program rand , which uses intrinsic non-determinism of the
thread-pool semantics to return either true or false:
let rand () = let x = ref(true) in
fork {x← false} ; !x
This program is secure w.r.t. Definition 2 (we will prove this
in § IV using SeLoC).
It is worth pointing out that if we modify the program and
insert an additional assignment of a high-sensitivity value h
to x, then the resulting program is not secure:
let randbad () = let x = ref(true) in
fork {x← h} ; fork {x← false} ; !x
The program is not secure because an attacker can pick a
scheduler that always executes the leaking assignment, or, even
simpler, can run the program many times under the uniform
scheduler. Because the program is not secure, we cannot prove
it in SeLoC. In SeLoC, we would verify each thread separately,
and we would not be able to verify the forked-off thread
x ← h (precisely because it makes the non-determinism of
assignments to the reference x dangerous).
IV. OVERVIEW OF SELOC
This section provides an overview of SeLoC by presenting
its proof rules for relational reasoning (§ IV-A), its invariant
mechanism (§ IV-B), its soundness theorem (§ IV-C), and
finally its protocol mechanism (§ IV-D) to verify the program
prog from § II. The grammar of SeLoC is as follows:
P,Q ∈ Prop ::= True | False | ∀x. P | ∃x. P | P ∗Q
| P −∗ Q | ℓ 7→θ v | awpθ e {Φ} (θ ∈ {L,R})
| dwpE e1 & e2 {Φ}
| P
N
| ⊲ P | P | |⇛
E1 E2P | . . .
SeLoC features the standard separation logic connectives
like separating conjunction (∗) and magic wand (−∗). Since
SeLoC is based on Iris [13]–[16], it also features all the Iris
connectives and modalities, in particular the later modality (⊲)
for dealing with recursion, the persistence modality () for
dealing with shareable resources, and the invariant connective
( P
N
) and the update modality ( |⇛E1 E2 ) for establishing and
relying on protocols. We will not introduce all of the Iris con-
nectives in detail, but rather explain them on a by-need basis.
An interested reader is referred to [16] and [23] for further
details. Various connectives are annotated with name spaces
N ∈ InvName and invariant masks E ⊆ InvName to handle
some bookkeeping. When the mask is omitted, it is assumed
to be ⊤, the largest mask. Furthermore, for convenience, we
let |⇛E denote |⇛
E E
. Readers who are unfamiliar with Iris can
safely ignore the name spaces and invariant masks.
A selection of proof rules of SeLoC is given in Figure 2.
Each inference rule
P1 . . . Pn
Q
in this paper should be read
as an entailment P1 ∗ . . .∗Pn ⊢ Q. In the subsequent sections
we explain and motivate the rules of SeLoC.
A. Relational reasoning
The quintessential connective of SeLoC is the double weak-
est precondition dwpE e1 & e2 {Φ}. It intuitively expresses
that any two runs of e1 and e2 are related in a lock-
step bisimulation-like way, and that the resulting values of
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any two terminating runs are related by the postcondition
Φ : Val → Val → Prop. We refer to e1 (resp. e2)
as the left-hand side (resp. the right-hand side). The dou-
ble weakest precondition is defined such that if ∀~n1 ~n2 ∈
Z. dwp e[~n1/~x] & e[~n2/~x] {v1 v2. v1 = v2} (with ~x the free
variable of e), then e is secure. We defer the precise soundness
statement to § IV-C.
A selection of rules for SeLoC’s double weakest precondi-
tion connective1 are given in Figure 2. Some of these rules
are straightforward generalizations of the ordinary weakest
precondition rules (e.g., DWP-VAL, DWP-WAND, DWP-FUPD, DW-
P-BIND). The more interesting rules are the symbolic execution
rules, which allow executing the programs on both sides in
a lock-step fashion. If both sides involve a pure-redex, we
can use DWP-PURE. The premises e →pure e′ denote that e
deterministically reduces to e′ without any side-effects (e.g.,
(if true then e else t)→pure e). If both sides involve a fork, we
can use the rule DWP-FORK, which is a generalization of Iris’s
fork rule to the relational case. In order to explain SeLoC’s
rules for symbolic execution of heap-manipulating expressions,
we need to introduce some additional machinery:
• Due to SeLoC’s relational nature, there are left- and right-
hand side versions of the points-to connectives ℓ 7→θ v
where θ ∈ {L,R}, which denote that the value v of
location ℓ in the heap associated with the left-hand side
program and the right-hand side program, resp.
• To avoid a quadratic explosion in combinations of all
possible heap-manipulating expressions on the left- and
the right-hand side, SeLoC includes a unary weakest
precondition awpθ e {Φ} for atomic and fork-free ex-
pressions. The rules for unary weakest preconditions
(e.g., AWP-STORE, AWP-LOAD, AWP-ALLOC) are similar to
those of Iris, but each rule is parameterized by a side
θ ∈ {L,R}.
The rule DWP-AWP connects dwp and awpθ . For instance,
using DWP-AWP, AWP-STORE and AWP-LOAD, we can derive the
following symbolic execution rule:
ℓ1 7→L v1 ℓ2 7→R v2
(ℓ1 7→L v1 ∗ ℓ2 7→R v
′
2) −∗ dwp v1 & () {Φ}
dwp ! ℓ1 & (ℓ2 ← v
′
2) {Φ}
B. Invariants
Let us demonstrate, by means of an example, how to use the
symbolic execution rules together with the powerful invariant
mechanism of Iris. Recall the rand example from § III-C. We
can use invariants to prove the following:
Proposition 3. dwp rand () & rand () {v1 v2. v1 = v2}.
Proof. First we use DWP-PURE to symbolically execute a β-
reduction. We then use DWP-BIND to “focus” on the ref(true)
1Some of the SeLoC rules involve the later modality ⊲, which is standard
for dealing with recursion and impredicative invariants [16, Section 5.5]. The
occurrences of ⊲ can be ignored for the purposes of this paper.
subexpression, leaving us with the goal:
dwp ref(true) & ref(true) {Φ}
where Φ(ℓ1, ℓ2) , dwp let x = ℓ1 in . . . &
let x = ℓ2 in . . . {v1 v2. v1 = v2}
We then symbolically execute the allocation, using DWP-AWP
and AWP-ALLOC, obtaining ℓ1 7→L true and ℓ2 7→R true:
ℓ1 7→L true ∗ ℓ2 7→R true
⊢ dwp fork {ℓ1 ← false} ; ! ℓ1 &
fork {ℓ2 ← false} ; ! ℓ2 {v1 v2. v1 = v2}
At this point we are tempted to apply DWP-FORK; however,
in both the main thread and the forked-off thread we need the
points-to connectives ℓ1 7→L − and ℓ2 7→R − to symbolically
execute the dereference and assignment to ℓ1 and ℓ2. To share
the points-to connectives between both threads, we put them
into an Iris-style invariant.
Iris-style invariants are denoted using boxes: P
N
, which
are duplicable resources (see INV-DUP). Unlike in other logics,
Iris-style invariants are not attached to locks. Rather, one can
explicitly open an invariant during an atomic step of execution
to get access to its contents. To create a new invariant we
use the DWP-INV-ALLOC rule, which allows to allocate a new
invariant P
N
with a name space N ∈ InvName from a re-
source described by P . This allows for P to be shared between
different threads (using INV-DUP). To access an invariant we
use the rule DWP-INV. It allow us to open an invariant during
an atomic symbolic execution step. The masks E ⊆ InvName
on dwp are used to keep track of which invariants have been
open. This is done to prevent invariant reentrancy.
Returning to our example, we can use DWP-INV-ALLOC to
allocate the following invariant:
I , ∃b ∈ B. ℓ1 7→L b ∗ ℓ2 7→R b
N
This invariant not only allows different threads to access ℓ1 and
ℓ2 (via INV-DUP), but it also ensures that ℓ1 and ℓ2 contain the
same Boolean value throughout the execution.
The proof then proceeds as follows. We apply DWP-FORK
and get two new goals:
1) I ⊢ dwp ℓ1 ← false& ℓ2 ← false {True};
2) I ⊢ dwp ! ℓ1 & ! ℓ2 {v1 v2. v1 = v2}.
The invariant I we have established can be shared for proving
both of those goals. The first goal requires us to prove that
assigning false to both ℓ1 and ℓ2 is safe. We verify this by
applying DWP-INV, and temporarily opening the invariant I to
obtain ℓ1 7→L b and ℓ2 7→R b. We then apply DWP-AWP, and
symbolically execute the assignment to obtain ℓ1 7→L false
and ℓ2 7→R false. At the end of this atomic step, we verify
that the invariant I still holds.
The second goal is solved in a similar way. When we
dereference ℓ1 and ℓ2 we know that they contain the same
value because of the invariant I .
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DWP-VAL
Φ(v1, v2)
dwpE v1 & v2 {Φ}
DWP-WAND
dwpE e1 & e2 {Ψ} (∀v1 v2.Ψ(v1, v2) −∗ Φ(v1, v2))
dwpE e1 & e2 {Φ}
DWP-FUPD
|⇛E dwpE e1 & e2 {v1 v2. |⇛E Φ(v1, v2)}
dwpE e1 & e2 {Φ}
DWP-BIND
dwp e1 & e2 {v1 v2. dwpK1[ v1 ] &K2[ v2 ] {Φ}}
dwpK1[ e1 ] &K2[ e2 ] {Φ}
DWP-PURE
e1 →pure e
′
1 e2 →pure e
′
2 ⊲ dwp e
′
1 & e
′
2 {Φ}
dwp e1 & e2 {Φ}
DWP-FORK
⊲ dwp e1 & e2 {True} ⊲Φ()()
dwpE (fork {e1}) & (fork {e2}) {Φ}
DWP-AWP
awpL e1 {Ψ1} awpR e2 {Ψ2} (∀v1, v2. (Ψ1(v1) ∗Ψ2(v2)) −∗ ⊲Φ(v1, v2))
dwpE e1 & e2 {Φ}
AWP-STORE
ℓ 7→θ v1 (ℓ 7→θ v2 −∗ Φ())
awpθ ℓ← v2 {Φ}
AWP-LOAD
ℓ 7→θ v (ℓ 7→θ v −∗ Φ(v))
awpθ ! ℓ {Φ}
AWP-ALLOC
∀ℓ. ℓ 7→θ v −∗ Φ(ℓ)
awpθ ref(v) {Φ}
DWP-INV-ALLOC
P ( P
N
−∗ dwp e1 & e2 {Φ})
dwp e1 & e2 {Φ}
INV-DUP
P
N
P
N
∗ P
N
DWP-INV
P
N
(⊲ P −∗ dwpE−N e1 & e2 {v1 v2. P ∗ Φ(v1, v2)}) atomic(e1) atomic(e2) N ∈ E
dwpE e1 & e2 {Φ}
Figure 2. A selection of the proof rules of SeLoC.
C. Soundness
We now state SeLoC’s soundness theorem, which guaran-
tees that verified programs are actually secure w.r.t. Defini-
tion 2.
As we have described in § III-B, we fix a set L of output
locations that we assume to be observable by the attacker. We
require these locations to always contain the same data in both
runs of the program. To reflect this in the logic, we define a
proposition that owns the observable locations and forces them
to contain the same values in both heaps:
IL ,∗ℓ∈L ∃i ∈ Z. ℓ 7→L i ∗ ℓ 7→R i N .(ℓ,ℓ)
When we verify a program under the invariant IL, we are
forced to interact with the locations in L as if they are
permanently publicly observable. With this in mind we state
the soundness theorem, which we prove in §VII.
Theorem 4 (Soundness). Suppose that:
IL ⊢ dwp e[~i/~x] & e[~j/~x] {v1 v2. v1 = v2}
is derivable, where ~x are the free variables of e, and ~i and ~j
are lists of integers with |~i| = |~j| = |~x|, then:
• the expression e is secure, and,
• the configuration (e[~i/~x], σ) is safe (i.e., cannot get stuck)
for any heap σ with σ ∼L σ.
D. Protocols
Now that we have seen the basics of Iris-style invariants
in SeLoC, let us use the protocol mechanism SeLoC inherits
from Iris to verify the example prog from Figure 1. We
prove the following proposition, which serves as a premise
for Theorem 4, and therefore implies the security of prog .
Proposition 5. For any integers i1, i2 ∈ Z, we have I{out} ⊢
dwp prog out i1 & prog out i2 {v1 v2. v1 = v2 = ((), ())}.
Proof. We first need a derived rule for parallel composition
(which we defined in terms of fork in § III-A). The parallel
composition operation satisfies a binary version of the standard
specification in Concurrent Separation Logic [11]:
DWP-PAR
dwp e1 & s1 {Ψ1} dwp e2 & s2 {Ψ2}(
∀v1, v2, w1, w2. (Ψ1(v1, w1) ∗Ψ2(v2, w2)) −∗
Φ((v1, w1), (v2, w2))
)
dwp (e1 || e2) & (s1 || s2) {Φ}
Second, we need to establish a protocol on the way the values
in the record r may evolve. We identify three logical states
State , {Classified, Intermediate,Declassified} the record r
can be in; visualized in Figure 3:
1) Classified, if the data stored in the record is classified,
and r .is classified points to true;
2) Intermediate, when the data stored in the record is not
classified anymore, but r .is classified still points to true;
3) Declassified, when the data stored in the record is not
classified and r .is classified points to false. This state is
final in the sense that once the state of the record becomes
Declassified, it forever remains so.
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The protocol as a transition system:
Classified Intermediate Declassified
The rules for ghost state:
STATE-AGREE
in state(s1) state token(s2)
s1 = s2
STATE-CHANGE
s1 s2 in state(s1) state token(s1)
|⇛
E
in state(s2) ∗ state token(s2)
DECLASSIFIED-DUP
state token(Declassified)
state token(Declassified) ∗ state token(Declassified)
The invariant:
(
in state(Classified) ∗ ∃i1, i2. r1.is classified 7→L true ∗
r2.is classified 7→R true ∗ r1.data 7→L i1 ∗ r2.data 7→R i2
)
∨
(
in state(Intermediate) ∗ ∃i. r1.is classified 7→L true ∗
r2.is classified 7→R true ∗ r1.data 7→L i ∗ r2.data 7→R i
)
∨
(
in state(Declassified) ∗ ∃i. r1.is classified 7→L false ∗
r2.is classified 7→R false ∗ r1.data 7→L i ∗ r2.data 7→R i
)
N
Figure 3. Value-dependent classification.
The idea behind the proof is as follows: we use an invariant to
track the logical state together with the points-to connectives
for the physical state of the record. This way, we ensure that
the protocol is followed by both threads.
To model the protocol in SeLoC, we use Iris’s mecha-
nism for user-defined ghost state. The exact way this mech-
anism works is not important, and is described in [13], [16].
What is important, is that it enables us to define tokens
in state, state token : State → Prop that satisfy the laws
in Figure 3. The token in state will be shared using an
invariant, while thread2 will own the token state token. Rule
STATE-AGREE states that the tokens in state and state token
agree on the logical state. If a thread has the token, it can
change the logical state using STATE-CHANGE, but only in way
that respects the protocol described by the transition system.
Finally, the rule DECLASSIFIED-DUP states that once a thread
learns that the record is in the final state, i.e., Declassified,
this knowledge remains true forever.
The invariant that ties together the ghost and physical state
is shown in Figure 3. It is defined for the records r1 and r2,
for the left hand side and the right hand side, resp. We verify
each thread separately with respect to this invariant, which we
open every time we access the record.
Proof of thread1 : We use the symbolic execution rules
for dereferencing r1.is classified and r2.is classified until
both of them become true. At that point, the invariant tells us
that we are in the Declassified state. Subsequently, when using
the symbolic execution rule for dereferencing r1.data and
TYPED-IF
Γ ⊢ e : boolL Γ ⊢ t : τ Γ ⊢ u : τ
Γ ⊢ if e then t else u : τ
TYPED-STORE
Γ ⊢ e : ref τ Γ ⊢ t : τ
Γ ⊢ e← t : unit
TYPED-OUT
ℓ ∈ L
Γ ⊢ ℓ : ref intL
Figure 4. A selection of the typing rules.
r2.data , we use a copy of the token state token(Declassified)
to determine that the last disjunct of the invariant must hold.
From that, we know that both r1.data and r2.data contain the
same value. Using this information we can safely symbolically
execute the assignments to the output location out .
Proof of thread2 : We start the proof with the initial token
state token(Classified) and update the logical state with each
assignment. The complete formalized proof can be found in
the Coq formalization.
V. TYPE SYSTEM AND LOGICAL RELATIONS
We show how to define a simple information-flow aware
type system as an abstraction on top of SeLoC using the
technique of logical relations. While logical relations have
been used to model type systems and logics for safety and
contextual refinement in (variants of) Iris before [17]–[19],
[24], [25], we use them—for the first time—to model a type
system for non-interference (§V-A). We moreover show how
we can combine type-checked code with code that has been
manually verified using double weakest preconditions (§V-B).
The types that we consider are as follows:
τ ∈ Type ::= unit | intχ | boolχ | τ×τ ′ | ref τ | (τ → τ ′)χ
Here, χ, ξ ∈ Lbl range over the sensitivity labels {L,H} that
form a lattice with L ⊑ H. While any bounded lattice will do,
we use the two-element lattice for brevity’s sake.
The typing judgment is of the form Γ ⊢ e : τ where Γ is
an assignment of variables to types, e is an expression, τ is
a type. Some typing rules are given in Figure 4, and the rest
can be found in Appendix A. The rule TYPED-OUT shows that
every output location ℓ ∈ L is typed as a reference to a low-
sensitivity integer. By τ ⊔ξ we denote the level stamping, e.g.,
int
χ ⊔ ξ = intχ⊔ξ . See Appendix A for the full definition.
Notice that the type system we consider has no sensitivity
labels on reference types and no program counter label on the
typing judgment, which is usual for security type systems for
languages with (higher-order) references [1]–[3], [26]. Direct
adaptation of such type systems is not sound with respect to
the termination-sensitive notion of non-interference that we
consider. A counterexample is provided in Appendix C-A.
A. Logical relations model
We give a semantic model of our type system using logical
relations. The key idea of logical relations is to interpret each
type τ as a relation on values, i.e., to each type τ we assign an
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JunitK(v1, v2) , v1 = v2 = ()
JintχK(v1, v2) , v1, v2 ∈ Z ∗ (χ = L→ v1 = v2)
JboolχK(v1, v2) , v1, v2 ∈ B ∗ (χ = L→ v1 = v2)
Jτ × τ ′K(v1, v2) , ∃w1, w2, w
′
1, w
′
2.
v1 = (w1, w
′
1) ∗ v2 = (w2, w
′
2) ∗
JτK(w1 , w2) ∗ Jτ
′K(w′1, w
′
2)
Jref τK(v1, v2) , v1, v2 ∈ Loc ∗
∃w1 w2. v1 7→L w1 ∗
v2 7→R w2 ∗ JτK(w1 , w2)
N .(v1,v2)
J(τ → τ ′)χK(v1, v2) , 
(
∀w1, w2. JτK(w1, w2) −∗
Jτ ′ ⊔ χKe(v1 w1)(v2 w2)
)
JτKe(e1, e2) , dwp e1 & e2 {JτK}
Figure 5. The logical relations interpretation of types.
LOGREL-IF-LOW
dwp e1 & e2
{
JboolLK
}
dwp t1 & t2 {Φ} dwp u1 & u2 {Φ}
dwp if e1 then t1 else u1 & if e2 then t2 else u2 {Φ}
LOGREL-STORE
dwp e1 & e2 {Jref τK} dwp t1 & t2 {JτK}
dwp (e1 ← t1) & (e2 ← t2) {JunitK}
Figure 6. A selection of compatibility rules.
interpretation JτK : Val×Val→ Prop where Prop is the type
of SeLoC propositions. Intuitively, JτK(v1, v2) expresses that
v1 and v2 of type τ are indistinguishable by a low-sensitivity
attacker. The definition of JτK is given in Figure 5. We will
now explain some interesting cases in detail.
The interpretation JintLK contains the pairs of equal in-
tegers, while JintHK contains the pairs of any two integers.
This captures the intuition that a low-sensitivity attacker can
observe low-sensitivity integers, but not high-sensitivity inte-
gers.
The interpretation Jref τK captures that references ℓ1 and
ℓ2 are indistinguishable iff they always hold values w1 and
w2 that are indistinguishable at type τ . This is formalized by
imposing an invariant that contains both points-to propositions
ℓ1 7→L w1 and ℓ2 7→R w2, as well as the interpretation of τ that
links the values w1 and w2. Notice that our interpretation of
references does not require the locations ℓ1 and ℓ2 themselves
to be syntactically equal. This is crucial for modeling dynamic
allocation (recall that the allocation oracle described in § III-A
may depend on the contents of the heap).
The interpretation J(τ → τ ′)χK captures that functions v1
and v2 are indistinguishable iff for all inputs w1 and w2
indistinguishable at type τ , the behaviors of the expressions
v1 w1 and v2 w2 are indistinguishable at type τ
′ ⊔ χ. To
formalize what it means for the behavior of expressions (in this
case v1 w1 and v2 w2) to be indistinguishable, we define the
expression interpretation JτKe : Expr×Expr→ Prop by lifting
the value interpretation using double weakest preconditions.
The interpretation of functions is defined using the persis-
tence modality  of Iris [16, Section 2.3]. Intuitively, P
states that P holds without asserting ownership of any non-
shareable resources. Having the persistence modality in this
definition is a technical requirement commonly employed
when encoding logical relations in Iris [17]. It ensures that
indistinguishable functions remain indistinguishable forever.
The interpretation of expressions J Ke generalizes to open
terms by considering all possible well-typed substitutions. A
(binary) substitution γ is a function Var→ Val×Val. We write
γi(e) for a term e where each free variable x is substituted by
πi(γ(x)). We say that a substitution γ is well-typed, denoted
as JΓK(γ), iff ∀x. JτK(γ(Γ(x))). We then define the semantic
typing judgment as follows:
Γ |= e : τ , ∀γ. (JΓK(γ) ∗ IL) −∗ JτK
e(γ1(e), γ2(e))
Here, IL is the invariant on the observable locations (§ IV-C).
Theorem 6 (Soundness). If x1 : int
H, . . . , xn : int
H |= e :
int
L is a derivable in SeLoC, then e is secure.
Proof. This a direct consequence of Theorem 4.
The fundamental property of logical relations states that any
program that can be type checked is semantically typed.
Proposition 7 (Fundamental property). If Γ ⊢ e : τ , then
Γ |= e : τ is derivable in SeLoC.
Proof. This proposition is proved by induction on the typing
judgment Γ ⊢ e : τ using so-called compatibility rules for each
case. A selection of these rules is shown in Figure 6.
B. Combining binary and unary reasoning
When composing the fundamental property (Proposition 7)
and the soundness theorem (Theorem 6) we obtain that any
typed program is secure. For instance, it allows us to show
that the rand program is secure by type checking it, instead
of performing a manual proof as done in Proposition 3.
However, semantic typing gives us more—it allows us to
combine type-checked code with manually verified code. Let
us consider the examples from § II, which are not typed
according to the typing rules, but which we can prove to
be semantically typed by dropping down to the interpretation
of the semantic typing judgment in terms of double weakest
preconditions.
Proposition 8. |= prog : ref intL → intH → unit×unit.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of Proposition 5.
Proposition 9. |= awk : intH → (unit→ unit)L → intL.
Proof. The proposition boils down to showing that for any
i1, i2 ∈ Z and f1, f2 with J(unit→ unit)LK(f1, f2), we have
dwp awk i1 f1 & awk i2 f2 {v1 v2. v1 = v2 = 0}. We verify
8
let new lock () = ref(false)
let rec acquire lk = if CAS(lk , false, true)
then () else acquire lk
let release lk = lk ← false
Figure 7. Implementation of a spin lock.
NEWLOCK-SPEC
R
dwp new lock () & new lock () {lk1 lk2. isLock(lk1, lk2, R)}
ISLOCK-DUP
isLock(lk1, lk2, R)
isLock(lk1, lk2, R) ∗ isLock(lk1, lk2, R)
ACQUIRE-SPEC
isLock(lk1, lk2, R)
dwp acquire lk1 & acquire lk2 {R ∗ locked(lk1, lk2)}
RELEASE-SPEC
isLock(lk1, lk2, R) R locked(lk1, lk2)
dwp release lk1 & release lk2 {True}
Figure 8. Proof rules for locks.
this by establishing a monotone protocol similar to the one
used in the proof of value-dependent classification in § IV-B.
The full proof can be found in the Coq formalization.
After establishing the semantic typing for, e.g., prog we can
use it in any context where a function of the type ref intL →
int
H → unit× unit is expected. For example:
h : intH, f : ref intL → intH → unit× unit
⊢ let x = ref(0) in fork {f x h} ; !x : intL
Using the fundamental property (Proposition 7) we obtain
a semantic typing judgment for the above program. Using
Proposition 8 we establish that if we substitute prog for f ,
the resulting program will still be semantically typed, and thus
secure by the soundness theorem (Theorem 6).
VI. MODULAR SPECIFICATIONS
We show that SeLoC supports compositional reasoning
through modular specifications of program modules. That is,
we show how to provide specifications of program modules
that can be used opaquely by clients, and show how clients can
be proved secure against such specifications without the need
for examining the module’s source code. A tangible benefit of
this approach is that the implementation of the module can be
replaced by a different one, as long as it still satisfies the same
specification. We demonstrate this approach on two examples:
we give modular specifications of dynamically created locks
(§VI-A) and dynamically classified references (§VI-B).
let new vdep v =
{
data = ref(v);
is classified = ref(false)
}
let read r = ! r.data
let store r v = r.data ← v
let classify r = r.is classified ← true
let declassify r v = r.data ← v; r.is classified ← false
let get classified r = ! r.is classified
Figure 9. Dynamically classified references.
A. Locks
The programming language considered in this paper does
not provide locks as primitive constructs. Instead, it provides
the low-level compare-and-set (CAS) operation using which
different kinds of locking mechanisms can be implemented. In
this section we consider the implementation and specification
of a spin-lock, whose code is displayed in Figure 7.
Figure 8 displays the specification of the lock. The specifica-
tion makes use of a relational generalization of the common
lock predicates in separation logic [27]–[29]. The predicate
isLock(lk1, lk2, R) expresses that the pair of locks lk1 and
lk2 protect the resources R, and the predicate locked(lk1, lk2)
expresses that the pair of locks is in acquired state.
In order to verify that the spin lock implementation con-
forms to the lock specification, we define the lock predicates
using Iris’s mechanism for invariants and user-defined ghost
state. The used invariant and proof is a generalization of the
ordinary proof for functional correctness in Iris.
The rules of our lock specification are similar to the rules
in logics with locks as primitives constructs, such as [6], [10].
There are two notable exceptions. First, in loc. cit. one needs to
fix the set of locks and associated resources upfront, whereas
here one can create locks dynamically and attach an arbitrary
resource R to each lock during the proof. Second, since locks
are not primitive constructs in SeLoC, the specification also
applies to different lock implementations, e.g., a ticket lock,
as we have shown in the Coq mechanization.
B. Dynamically classified references
We now consider a program module and specification for
dynamically classified references, i.e., references that contain
data with value-dependent security classification. This module
encapsulates and generalizes the code pertaining to dynami-
cally classified references that we used in the example in §II-A.
Encapsulating this code as a module has two advantages:
• Modularity. While we manually crafted an invariant and
protocol in the proof of the example (Proposition 5), we
now give a modular specification to the program module.
We have to verify this specification once, and can then
use it for the verification of any client.
• Generality. The specification that we present generalizes
to clients with multiple threads and different sharing
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NEW-VDEP
Jτ ⊔ χK(v1, v2)
dwp new vdep v1 & new vdep v2
{
r1 r2. val dep(τ, r1, r2) ∗ class(r1,r2)(χ, 1)
}
VALDEP-DUP
val dep(τ, r1, r2) ⊢ val dep(τ, r1, r2) ∗ val dep(τ, r1, r2)
CLASS-SPLIT
class(r1,r2)(χ, q1) ∗ class(r1,r2)(χ, q1) ⊣⊢ class(r1,r2)(χ, q1 + q2)
READ-SAFE
val dep(τ, r1, r2)
dwp read r1 & read r2 {v1 v2. Jτ ⊔HK(v1, v2)}
READ-SEQ
val dep(τ, r1, r2) class(r1,r2)(χ, q)
dwp read r1 & read r2
{
v1 v2. Jτ ⊔ χK(v1, v2) ∗ class(r1,r2)(χ, q)
}
STORE-SAFE
val dep(τ, r1, r2) JτK(v1, v2)
dwp store r1 v1 & store r2 v2 {True}
STORE-SEQ
val dep(τ, r1, r2) class(r1,r2)(χ, q) Jτ ⊔ χK(v1, v2)
dwp store r1 v1 & store r2 v2
{
class(r1,r2)(χ, q)
}
CLASSIFY-SEQ
val dep(τ, r1, r2) class(r1,r2)(χ, 1)
dwp classify r1 & classify r2
{
class(r1,r2)(H, 1)
}
DECLASSIFY-SEQ
val dep(τ, r1, r2) class(r1,r2)(χ, 1) JτK(v1, v2)
dwp declassify r1 v1 & declassify r2 v2
{
class(r1,r2)(L, 1)
}
GET-CLASSIFIED-SEQ
val dep(τ, r1, r2) class(r1,r2)(χ, q)
dwp get classified r1 & get classified r2
{
b1 b2. (b1 = b2) ∗ class(r1,r2)(χ, q) ∗ ((b1 = false)→ (χ = L))
}
Figure 10. Derived specifications for dynamically classified references.
models. For example, clients in which multiple threads
read and write to the dynamically classified reference,
or in which the data gets classified again. The Coq
formalization contains such an example.
The implementation of the module for dynamically clas-
sified references2 is shown in Figure 9. The proof rules
for the module are shown in Figure 10. These rules are
derived from more general HOCAP-style logically atomic
specifications [32], which can be found in Appendix B and
the Coq formalization.
The main ingredient is the representation predicate
val dep(τ, r1, r2), which expresses that the dynamically clas-
sified references r1 and r2 contain related data of type τ at
all times. Since val dep(τ, r1, r2) expresses mere knowledge
instead of ownership, it is duplicable (VALDEP-DUP).
With the representation predicate at hand we can formulate
weak specifications for some operations. For instance, the
rule READ-SAFE over-approximates the sensitivity-level of the
values returned by the read operation, and dually, the rule
STORE-SAFE under-approximates the sensitivity-level of the
values stored using the store operation.
Of course, at times we want to track the precise sensitivity-
level. For that we use a fractional token class(r1,r2)(χ, q) with
q ∈ (0, 1]Q. This token is reminiscent of fractional permissions
in ordinary separation logic. The proof rules for declassify
and classify (DECLASSIFY-SEQ and CLASSIFY-SEQ) require the
full fraction (q = 1) since they change the classification. The
2In this context declassification refers to changing the dynamic classification
of the reference. It is thus unrelated to static declassification policies [30], and
the declassify function is unrelated to the eponymous function from [31].
precise rules for read and store (READ-SEQ and STORE-SEQ)
do not change the classification, and thus require an arbitrary
fraction. The token is splittable according to CLASS-SPLIT so
it can be shared between multiple threads.
Since the rules for declassify and classify require a full
fraction (q = 1), they do not allow for fine-grained sharing3.
It is therefore not possible to verify a program that runs
declassify in parallel with classify . Note that it is good that
this is prohibited—running these operations in parallel result
in a race-condition, and you would not know what the final
classification would be. However, it is possible to verify a
program that runs declassify in parallel with read or store
(using precise rules for these two operations) by sharing the
token via an invariant. To access such a shared token one
has to use the more general HOCAP-style logically atomic
specifications found in Appendix B and the Coq formalization.
Verification: In order to verify the implementation, we
follow the usual approach of defining the representation predi-
cate val dep(τ, r1, r2) and token class(r1,r2)(χ, q) using Iris’s
invariant and protocol mechanism. The invariant expresses that,
at all times, the fields is classified of both records contain
the same Boolean value b, and that the data in the records
are related by Jτ ⊔ χK. The relation between the Boolean
values b and the security label χ, and the way it evolves, is
expressed using a protocol visualized as the transition system
in Figure 11.
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Classified
b = false
χ = H
Intermediate
b = true
χ = L
Declassified
b = true
χ = L
Figure 11. Transition system for the value-dependent classifications library.
VII. SOUNDNESS
We discuss the proof of SeLoC’s soundness theorem (The-
orem 6), which connects double weakest preconditions to the
notion of security, namely ρ-specific probabilistic bisimula-
tions (Definition 1). The proof consists of two steps. First, we
explain the model of double weakest preconditions in the Iris
framework (§VII-A). Second, we explain how to construct a
bisimulation out of this model (§VII-B). For reasons of space,
we cannot explain the details of Iris, so in this section we
presume the reader is familiar with those.
A. Model of double weakest preconditions
The model of the Iris logic [15], [16] consists of three
layers:
• The Iris base logic, which contains the standard separa-
tion logic connectives (e.g., ∗ and −∗), modalities (e.g., ⊲,
), and the machinery for user-defined ghost state.
• The invariant mechanism, which is built as a library on
top of the Iris base logic.
• The Iris program logic, which is built as a library on top
of the Iris base logic and invariant mechanism. It provides
weakest preconditions for proving safety and functional
correctness of concurrent programs.
We reuse the first two layers of Iris (the base logic and
the invariant mechanism), on top of which we model our new
notion of double weakest preconditions. Figure 12 contains
the formal definition of dwp e1 & e2 {Φ}, which captures that
the expressions e1 and e2 are executed in a lock-step manner.
This is done by considering two cases:
• Either, both expressions e1 and e2 are values that are
related by the postcondition Φ.
• Otherwise, both expressions e1 and e2 are reducible, and
for any reductions (e1, σ1) →t (e′1, σ
′
1) and (e2, σ2) →t
(e′2, σ
′
2), the expressions e
′
1 and e
′
2 are still related by dwp.
If e1 and e2 fork off threads ~e′1 and
~e′2, then all of the
forked-off threads are related pairwise by dwp.
Our definition of double weakest preconditions is inspired
by the definition of ordinary weakest preconditions in Iris and
the product program construction [33]. As such, instead of
Iris’s state interpretation S : State → Prop, we have a state
relation SR : State× State → Prop that keeps track of both
the left and right-hand side heaps.
3We can still achieve sharing by storing the token class(r1,r2)(χ, 1) in a
lock, as outlined in §VI-A.
B. Constructing a bisimulation
In order to prove that double weakest preconditions imply
the security condition (Definition 2), we need to construct a
scheduler specific probabilistic bisimulation (Definition 1). We
construct such a bisimulation in the following steps:
1) First, we define a relation R that “lifts” double weakest
preconditions out of the SeLoC logic into the metatheory
(Definition 10).
2) We then show that the relation R satisfies a number of
bisimulation-like properties (Lemma 12).
3) The relation R itself is not a bisimulation because it is
not transitive. We show that the transitive closure R∗ of
R is a strong low-bisimulation (Lemma 13).
4) Finally, we use the method of Sabelfeld and Sands [5]
to show that R∗ is a ρ-specific probabilistic bisimulation
for any scheduler ρ (Theorem 14).
Definition 10. We define the relation R on configurations of
the same size to be the following:
(e0e1 . . . em, σ1) R (s0s1 . . . sm, σ2) , ∃n : N.
True ⊢
(
|⇛⊤ ∅ ⊲ |⇛∅ ⊤
)n
|⇛⊤SR(σ1, σ2) ∗ IL ∗
dwp e0 & s0 {v1 v2. v1 = v2} ∗
∗1≤i≤m. dwp ei & si {True}
Note thatR is defined at the meta-level, i.e., outside SeLoC;
in particular the existential quantifier ∃n : N is at the meta-
level. The relation R relates two configurations if all the
threads are related by a double weakest precondition, and
execution of the main threads furthermore result in the same
value. The invariant IL (which has been defined in § IV-C)
guarantees that the output locations L always contain the same
data between any executions of the two configurations. The
existentially quantified natural number n bound the number
of times the definition of double weakest preconditions has
been unfolded. It is needed to show that R is closed under
reductions.
The relation R allows one to “lift” double weakest precon-
dition proofs from inside the logic:
Proposition 11. If σ1 and σ2 are heaps such that σ1 ∼L σ2,
and IL ⊢ dwp e & s {v1 v2. v1 = v2} is derivable in SeLoC,
then (e, σ1) R (s, σ2).
Proof. For showing (e, σ1) R (s, σ2), pick n = 0. Because
σ1 and σ2 agree on the L-locations (i.e., σ1 ∼L σ2), we can
establish the state relation SR(σ1, σ2) and the invariant IL.
Lemma 12. The following properties hold:
1) R is symmetric;
2) If (v~e, σ1) R (w~s, σ2), then v = w;
3) If (~e, σ1) R (~s, σ2), then |~e| = |~s| and σ1 ∼L σ2;
4) If (e0 . . . ei . . . , σ1) R (s0 . . . si . . . , σ2) and (ei, σ1)→t
(e′i~e, σ
′
1), then there exist an s
′
i, ~s and σ
′
2 such that:
• (si, σ2)→t (s′i~s, σ
′
2);
• (e0 . . . e
′
i~e . . . , σ
′
1) R (s0 . . . s
′
i~s . . . , σ
′
2).
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dwp e1 & e2 {Φ} ,


|⇛⊤Φ(e1, e2) if e1, e2 ∈ Val
|⇛⊤False if e1 ∈ Val xor e2 ∈ Val
∀σ1 σ2. SR(σ1, σ2) −∗ |⇛
⊤ ∅
red(e1, σ1) ∗ red(e2, σ2) ∗
∀e′1 σ
′
1 ~e1 e
′
2 σ
′
2 ~e2. (e1, σ1)→t (e
′
1 ~e1, σ
′
1) ∧ (e2, σ2)→t (e
′
2 ~e2, σ
′
2) −∗
|⇛∅ ∅ ⊲ |⇛∅ ⊤SR(σ′1, σ
′
2) ∗ dwp e
′
1 & e
′
2 {Φ} ∗∗e′′1∈ ~e1,e′′2∈ ~e2 .dwp e′′1 & e′′2 {True} otherwise
Figure 12. The model of double weakest preconditions.
By the above lemma, we now know that R has all the
properties of a strong low-bisimulation (c.f. [5, Definition 6]),
short of being a partial equivalence relation. Since R is not
transitive, we consider its transitive closureR∗, and verify that
all the properties of a strong low-bisimulation hold for R∗.
Lemma 13. The relation R∗ is a strong low-bisimulation.
That is, the following properties hold:
1) R∗ is a partial equivalence relation (i.e., symmetric and
transitive);
2) If (v~e, σ1) R∗ (w~s, σ2), then v = w;
3) If (~e, σ1) R∗ (~s, σ2), then |~e| = |~s| and σ1 ∼L σ2;
4) If (e0 . . . ei . . . , σ1) R∗ (s0 . . . si . . . , σ2) and
(ei, σ1) →t (e
′
i~e, σ
′
1), then there exist an s
′
i, ~s and
σ′2 such that:
• (si, σ2)→t (s′i~s, σ
′
2);
• (e0 . . . e
′
i~e . . . , σ
′
1) R
∗ (s0 . . . s
′
i~s . . . , σ
′
2).
Finally, we arrive at the desired theorem (Theorem 14),
which in combination with Proposition 11 implies the sound-
ness of SeLoC (Theorem 6).
Theorem 14. The relation R∗ is a ρ-specific probabilistic
bisimulation for any scheduler ρ.
Proof. Let ρ be an arbitrary scheduler. The conditions 1, 2,
and 3(a) hold by Lemma 13. In order to verify condition 3(b),
we follow the approach of Sabelfeld and Sand [5, Proposi-
tion 3] and establish the equality of sums using a one-to-one
correspondence between the underlying multisets.
VIII. MECHANIZATION IN COQ
We have mechanized the definition of SeLoC, the type sys-
tem, the soundness proof (with the exception of Theorem 14),
and all examples and derived constructions in the paper and
the appendix using the Coq proof assistant. The mechanization
has been built on top of the mechanization of Iris [14]–[16],
which readily provides, among others, the Iris base logic, the
invariant mechanism, and the HeapLang language.
For the proof of soundness (§VII), we have mechanized that
double weakest preconditions give rise to the existence of a
strong low-bisimulation R∗ (Lemma 13), but omitted the last
step showing that R∗ is also a scheduler-specific probabilistic
bisimulation (Theorem 14). We have omitted this step because
the proof is based on a standard argument by Sabelfeld and
Sands [5], which involves notions from probability theory.
To carry out the mechanization effectively, we have made
extensive use of the tactic language MoSeL (formerly Iris
Proof Mode) for separation logic in Coq [17], [34]. Using
MoSeL we were able to carry out in Coq the typical kind of
reasoning steps one would do on paper. This was essential to
mechanize the SeLoC logic (1740 line of Coq code), the type
system (748 lines), and all the examples (1935 lines).
IX. RELATED WORK
A. Strong and probabilistic bisimulations
The security condition we use, a scheduler specific proba-
bilistic bisimulation due to Sabelfeld and Sands [5], has been
studied in a variety of related work.
In their original paper [5], Sabelfeld and Sands devised the
notion of a strong low-bisimulation, and applied it to a first-
order stateful language with concurrency. This notion is sound
w.r.t. a scheduler specific probabilistic bisimulation, and can
therefore be used to ease the construction of the latter. Strong
low-bisimulations are highly compositional: if a thread e is
secure w.r.t. a strong low-bisimulation, then the composition of
e with any other thread is secure. Unfortunately, this property
makes it non-trivial to adapt strong low-bisimulations for flow-
sensitive analyses. Our method is flow-sensitive because we
compose the components at the level of the logic (as double
weakest preconditions), and not at the level of the bisimula-
tions, despite the fact that we use strong low-bisimulations as
an auxiliary notion in our soundness proof. By performing
the composition at the level of the logic, we can use Iris
invariants and modular specifications to put restrictions onto
which threads can be composed.
Another way of enabling flow-sensitive analysis was devel-
oped by Mantel et al. [4], who relaxed the notion of a strong
low-bisimulation to a strong low-bisimulation modulo modes.
Their approach enables rely-guarantee style reasoning at the
level of the bisimiluations. Notably, using the notion of strong
low-bisimulations modulo modes one can specify that no other
threads can read or write to a certain location.
Based on the notion of strong low-bisimulations modulo
modes, the Covern project [6], [7], [35] developed a series of
logics for rely/guarantee reasoning. Notably, Murray et al. [6]
presented the first fully mechanized program logic for non-
interference of concurrent programs with shared memory,
which is also called Covern. While Covern is not a separation
logic, it has been extended to allow for flexible reasoning
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about non-interference in presence of value-dependent classi-
fications [7]. In terms of the object language, Covern does not
support fine-grained concurrency, arrays, or dynamically allo-
cated references. Since Covern does not support fine-grained
concurrency, locks are modeled as primitives in the language
and logic, while they are derived constructs in our work. As a
result of that, Covern’s notion of strong-low bisimulations is
tied to the operational semantics of locks, i.e., it is considered
modulo the variables that are held by locks. The set of locks,
and the variables they protect, has to be provided statically.
Hence their approach does not immediately generalize to
support dynamically allocated locks, nor to reason about locks
that protect other resources than permissions to write to or read
from variables. Value-dependent classifications are also prim-
itive in Covern [7], while they are derived constructs in our
work. Covern has two separate primitive rules for assignment
to “normal” variables and for assignment to “control” variables
(i.e., variables that signify the classification levels).
Another variant of probabilistic bisimulations has been
developed by Smith [36], who considered considered weak
probabilistic bisimulations for a language with a fork construct,
but without dynamic allocation. Contrary to our work, the
security condition obtained that way is timing-insensitive.
B. Program logics for non-interference
Early work by Beringer and Hofmann [37] established a
connection between Hoare logic and non-interference. They
did so for a first-order sequential language with a simple non-
interference condition. Non-interference was encoded through
self-composition and renaming, making sure that both parts of
the composed program operate on different parts of the heap
(something that one gets by construction in separation logic).
Notably, they proved the non-interference property of two type
systems by constructing models of the type systems in their
Hoare logic. They also showed how to extend their approach
to object-oriented type systems.
C. Separation logics for non-interference
Karbyshev et al. [9] devised a compositional type-and-effect
system based on separation logic to prove non-interference
of concurrent programs with channels. Their system is sound
w.r.t. termination-insensitive non-interference allowing for
races on low-sensitivity locations. They consider security for
arbitrary (deterministic) schedulers, and allow for a reschedul-
ing operation in the programming language to prevent sched-
uler tainting. To achieve that, their logical rule for rescheduling
treats the scheduler as a splittable separation logic resource,
allowing one to share it between threads. In terms of the object
language, they consider a first-order language without dynamic
memory allocation, and the concurrency primitives are based
on channels with send and receive operations rather than our
low-level fine-grained concurrencymodel. They do not provide
a logic for modular reasoning about program modules.
The recently proposed separation logic SecCSL [10] enables
reasoning about value-dependent information flow control
policies through a relational interpretation of separation logic.
One of the main advantages of the SecCSL approach is its
amenability to automation. However, to achieve that, they
restrict to a first-order separation logic with restricted language
features, i.e., a first-order language with first-order references,
and a coarse-grained synchronization mechanism. SecCSL
does not support dynamically allocated references out of the
box. However, we believe that it can be extended to support
dynamic allocation, as long as the semantics for allocation are
deterministic and do not depend on the global heap.
The security condition in SecCSL [10] is non-standard, and
is geared to providing meaning to the intermediate Hoare
triples. Because of that, their formulation of non-interference
is closely intertwined with the semantics of the logic.
D. Type systems for non-interference
As discussed in the introduction (§ I), a lot of work on
non-interference in the programming languages area has fo-
cused on type-system based approaches. Such approaches are
amendable to high degrees of automation, but lack the ability
to reason about functional correctness. Due to an abundance
of prior work on in this area, we restrict to directly related
work.
Pottier and Simonet developed Flow Caml [1], a type
system for termination-insensitive non-interference for sequen-
tial higher-order language in the spirit of Caml. Soundness
w.r.t. non-interference is proven with the product programs
technique. This kind of self-composition was an inspiration
for our model of double weakest preconditions, although we
avoid self-composition of programs at the syntactic level.
Terauchi [26] devised a capabilities-based type system for
observational determinism [38]. Observational determinism is
a formulation non-interference for concurrent programs that
is substantially different from the probabilistic bisimulation
considered in this paper. In particular, under observational
determinism, no races on low-sensitivity locations are allowed,
ruling out e.g., the rand function from § III-C.
E. Logical relation models
The technique of logical relations is widely used for proving
the soundness of type systems and logics. The work on
step-indexing [39], [40] made it possible to scale logical
relations to languages with higher-order references and re-
cursive types. Notably, Rajani and Garg [2] describe a step-
indexed Kripke-style model for two information flow aware
type systems for a sequential language with higher-order
references. While they do not consider concurrency and their
notion of non-interference is different from ours (their notion
is termination- and progress-insensitive), their model is similar
in spirit. However, we make use of the “logical” approach
to step-indexing [41] in Iris to avoid explicit step-indexes in
definitions and proofs.
The relational model of our type system is directly inspired
by a line of work on interpretation of type systems and logical
relations in Iris [17]–[19], [24], [25], but this previous work fo-
cused on reasoning about safety and contextual equivalence of
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programs, while we target non-interference. For that purpose
we developed double weakest preconditions.
The idea of using logical relations to reason about the
combination of typed and manually verified code has been
used before in the context of Iris. Notably, Jung et al. [18] use
it to reason about unsafe code in Rust, and Krogh-Jespersen
et al. [24] use it in the context of type-and-effect systems.
X. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have presented SeLoC—the first separation logic
for non-interference that supports fine-grained concurrency,
higher-order functions, and dynamic (higher-order) references.
The key feature of SeLoC is its novel connective for dou-
ble weakest preconditions, which in combination with Iris-
style invariants, allows for compositional reasoning. We have
demonstrated this ability by building an information-flow
aware type system on top of SeLoC, which can be used
to combine type checked code with manually verified code,
and by verifying non-interference of a variety of challenging
examples. We have proved soundness of SeLoC with respect
to a standard notion of security.
In future work we want to develop a more expressive type
system. To develop this type system, we want to transfer back
reasoning principles from SeLoC into constructs that can be
type checked automatically. Moreover, we would like to study
declassification in the sense of delimited information release
and static declassification policies [30], [31], [42], [43].
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APPENDIX A
TYPE SYSTEM
We give the full definition of the type system described in
§V. Types are inductively defined as:
τ ∈ Type ::= unit | intχ | boolχ | τ×τ ′ | ref τ | (τ → τ ′)χ
The level stamping function is defined as:
unit ⊔ ξ , unit
int
χ ⊔ ξ , intχ⊔ξ
bool
χ ⊔ ξ , boolχ⊔ξ
(τ × τ ′) ⊔ ξ , (τ ⊔ ξ)× (τ ′ ⊔ ξ)
(ref τ) ⊔ ξ , ref τ
(τ → τ ′)χ ⊔ ξ , (τ → τ ′)χ⊔ξ
The subtyping and typing rules can be found in Figure 13 and
Figure 14. The compatibility rules can be found in Figure 15.
APPENDIX B
HOCAP-STYLE MODULAR SPECIFICATIONS
We provide modular logically atomic specifications for the
module of dynamically classified references (§ VI-B) in Fig-
ure 16. These specifications are stronger than the ones given
in Figure 16 in the sense that they are logically atomic, i.e.,
they allow one to open invariants around operations. This is
achieved using the HOCAP [32] approach to logical atomicity.
More information about HOCAP-style specifications in Iris
can be found in [23, Chapter 10]. Note that the weaker
specifications in Figure 16 can be derived from the rules in
Figure 16.
APPENDIX C
DISCUSSION
We discuss some miscellaneous topics that are not required
for an overall comprehension of the paper.
A. Sensitivity labels on references and aliasing
Most type systems for non-interference for languages with
(higher-order) references annotate reference types with sen-
sitivity labels and annotate the typing judgment with a
program counter label [1]–[3], [26]. These annotations are
used to prevent leaks via aliasing, while allowing more pro-
grams to be typed. On the contrary, our type system (§ V)
does not have such annotations because some programs that
are typeable using such annotations are not secure w.r.t. a
termination-sensitive notion of non-interference (like the no-
tion of scheduler specific bisimulations that we use). For
example, termination-insensitive type systems usually accept
the following program as secure:
if h then f else g) ()
where h is a high-sensitivity Boolean, and f and g are
functions of type (unit → unit)L. Under a termination-
sensitive notion of security, the program is not secure because
f and g can examine different termination behavior.
Despite this, let us examine why exactly we do not need
labels on reference types to prevent leaks via aliasing, and
argue that our approach still allows for benign aliasing of ref-
erences. A classic example of a sensitive information leakage
via reference aliasing is the following program p1:
let p1 r s h = r ← true; s← true;
let x = (if h then r else s) in
x← false; ! r
Both r and s contain low-sensitivity data, but by aliasing one
or the other with x, the program leaks the high-sensitivity
value h. In previous approaches such leaks are avoided by
tracking aliasing information through sensitivity labels on
references. The variable x would be typed as (ref intL)H
because it was aliased in a high-sensitivity context (branching
on h). The consequent assignment x← false is then prevented
by the type system since the label on the reference (H) is not
a below the label of the values that are stored in the reference
(L).
In SeLoC, the variable x will not be typeable at all. To
see why that is the case, suppose we want to prove that the
program is secure. For this, we let h1 and h2 denote high-
sensitivity inputs for two runs of the program, and r1, s1
(resp. r2, s2) denote the low-sensitivity references arguments
for the left-hand side program (resp. right-hand side program).
Under these high-sensitivity inputs, we need to prove that the
bodies of the let-expressions are indistinguishable, i.e.,
dwp if h1 then r1 else s1 & if h2 then r2 else s2
{
Jref intLK
}
Proving this proposition, would in particular require proving
dwp r1 & s2
{
Jref intLK
}
, which is impossible in SeLoC.
If we remove the trailing assignment x← false the resulting
program p2 becomes trivially secure, and many termination-
insensitive type systems accept it as such:
let p2 r s h = r ← true; s← true;
let x = (if h then r else s) in
! r
Our type system cannot be used to type check this example:
as we have just explained, we cannot type the let-expression
at all. Despite this, we can fall back on the double weakest
preconditions to verify the security of p2, i.e., we can prove:
Jref boolLK(r1, r2) ∗ Jref bool
LK(s1, s2) ∗
JboolHK(h1, h2) ⊢ dwp p2 r1 s1 h1 & p2 r2 s2 h2 {JunitK}
by symbolic execution. Using our logic, we can perform a case
distinction on the Boolean values h1 and h2, which amounts
to proving dwp p2 r1 s1 true & p2 r2 s2 true {JunitK},
dwp p2 r1 s1 true& p2 r2 s2 false {JunitK}, etc.We solve all
these goals by symbolic execution. This example demonstrates
the advantages of combining typing with manual proofs.
We believe that the restriction on the typing of the let x-
binding is not unreasonable in case of termination-sensitive
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τ <: τ
τ1 <: τ2 τ2 <: τ3
τ1 <: τ3
χ1 ⊑ χ2
int
χ1 <: intχ2
χ1 ⊑ χ2
bool
χ1 <: boolχ2
χ1 ⊑ χ2 τ
′
1 <: τ1 τ2 <: τ
′
2
(τ1 → τ2)
χ1 <: (τ ′1 → τ
′
2)
χ2
τ1 <: τ
′
1 τ2 <: τ
′
2
τ1 × τ2 <: τ
′
1 × τ
′
2
Figure 13. The subtyping rules.
τ <: τ ′ Γ ⊢ e : τ
Γ ⊢ e : τ ′
Γ(x) = τ
Γ ⊢ x : τ
Γ ⊢ () : unit
i ∈ Z
Γ ⊢ i : intχ
b ∈ B
Γ ⊢ b : boolχ
Γ ⊢ e : intχ Γ ⊢ s : intξ
Γ ⊢ e+ s : intχ⊔ξ
ℓ ∈ L
Γ ⊢ ℓ : ref intL
f : (τ → τ ′)χ, x : τ,Γ ⊢ e : τ ′ ⊔ χ
Γ ⊢ rec f x = e : (τ → τ ′)χ
χ ⊑ L Γ ⊢ e : boolχ Γ ⊢ e1 : τ Γ ⊢ e2 : τ
Γ ⊢ if e then e1 else e2 : τ
Γ ⊢ e : (τ → τ ′)χ Γ ⊢ s : τ
Γ ⊢ e s : τ ′ ⊔ χ
Γ ⊢ e : τ
Γ ⊢ fork {e} : unit
Γ ⊢ e : τ
Γ ⊢ ref(e) : ref τ
Γ ⊢ e : ref τ
Γ ⊢ ! e : τ
Γ ⊢ e1 : ref τ Γ ⊢ e2 : τ
Γ ⊢ e1 ← e2 : unit
Γ ⊢ e1 : ref int
χ Γ ⊢ e2 : int
χ
Γ ⊢ FAA(e1, e2) : int
χ
Figure 14. The typing rules.
INTERP-SUB
τ1 <: τ2 Jτ1K(v1, v2)
Jτ2K(v1, v2)
LOGREL-SUB
τ1 <: τ2 dwp e1 & e2 {Jτ1K}
dwp e1 & e2 {Jτ2K}
LOGREL-INT-LOW
i ∈ Z
dwp i& i {JintχK}
LOGREL-INT
i1, i2 ∈ Z χ 6⊑ L
dwp i1 & i2 {Jint
χK}
LOGREL-BOOL-LOW
b ∈ B
dwp b& b {JboolχK}
LOGREL-BOOL
b1, b2 ∈ B χ 6⊑ L
dwp b1 & b2 {Jbool
χK}
LOGREL-BINOP
dwp e1 & e2 {Jint
χK} dwp s1 & s2
{
JintξK
}
dwp e1 + s1 & e2 + s2
{
Jintχ⊔ξK
}
LOGREL-REC
∀f1 f2 v1 v2. J(τ1 → τ2)
χK(f1, f2) ∗ Jτ1K(v1, v2) −∗ dwp e1[v1/x][f1/f ] & e2[v2/x][f2/f ] {Jτ2 ⊔ χK}
dwp (rec f x : = e1) & (rec f x : = e2) {J(τ1 → τ2)
χK}
LOGREL-IF-LOW
dwp e1 & e2
{
JboollK
}
dwp t1 & t2 {Φ} dwp u1 & u2 {Φ}
dwp if e1 then t1 else u1 & if e2 then t2 else u2 {Φ}
LOGREL-IF
dwp e1 & e2 {Jbool
χK}
dwp t1 & t2 {Φ} ∧ (χ 6⊑ L→ dwp u1 & t2 {Φ}) ∧ dwp u1 & u2 {Φ} ∧ (χ 6⊑ L→ dwp t1 & u2 {Φ})
dwp (if e1 then t1 else u1) & (if e2 then t2 else u2) {Φ}
LOGREL-APP
dwp e1 & e2 {J(τ1 → τ2)
χK} dwp s1 & s2 {Jτ1K}
dwp e1 s1 & e2 s2 {Jτ2 ⊔ χK}
LOGREL-SEQ
dwp e1 & e2 {Φ} dwp s1 & s2 {Ψ}
dwp e1; s1 & e2; s2 {Ψ}
LOGREL-FORK
dwp e1 & e2 {Φ}
dwp fork {e1} & fork {e2} {JunitK}
LOGREL-ALLOC
dwp e1 & e2 {JτK}
dwp ref(e1) & ref(e2) {Jref τK}
LOGREL-LOAD
dwp e1 & e2 {Jref τK}
dwp ! e1 & ! e2 {JτK}
LOGREL-STORE
dwp e1 & e2 {Jref τK} dwp t1 & t2 {JτK}
dwp (e1 ← t1) & (e2 ← t2) {JunitK}
LOGREL-FAA
dwp e1 & e2 {Jref int
χK} dwp t1 & t2 {Jint
χK}
dwp FAA(e1, t1) & FAA(e2, t2) {Jint
χK}
Figure 15. The compatibility rules.
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VALDEP-PERSISTENT
val dep(τ, r1, r2)
 val dep(τ, r1, r2)
CLASSIFICATION-AGREE
class(r1,r2)(χ1, q1) class(r1,r2)(χ2, q2)
χ1 = χ2
CLASSIFICATION-OP
class(r1,r2)(χ, q1) ∗ class(r1,r2)(χ, q2) ⊣⊢ class(r1,r2)(χ, q1 + q2)
CLASSIFICATION-1-EXCLUSIVE
class(r1,r2)(χ, 1) class(r1,r2)(χ, q)
False
CLASSIFICATION-AUTH-AGREEE
class auth(r1,r2)(χ1) class(r1,r2)(χ2, q)
χ1 = χ2
CLASSIFICATION-UPDATE
class auth(r1,r2)(χ) class(r1,r2)(χ, 1)
|⇛class auth(r1,r2)(χ
′) ∗ class(r1,r2)(χ
′, 1)
READ-SPEC
val dep(τ, r1, r2) (∀χ v1 v2. class auth(r1,r2)(χ) ∗ Jτ ⊔ χK(v1, v2) ≡−∗ class auth(r1,r2)(χ) ∗ Φ(v1, v2))
dwp read r1 & read r2 {Φ}
WRITE-SPEC
val dep(τ, r1, r2) (∀χ. class auth(r1,r2)(χ) ≡−∗ class auth(r1,r2)(χ) ∗ Jτ ⊔ χK(v1, v2) ∗ Φ((), ()))
dwp store r1 v1 & store r2 v2 {Φ}
IS-CLASSIFIED-SPEC
val dep(τ, r1, r2) (∀χ b. class auth(r1,r2)(χ) ≡−∗ class auth(r1,r2)(χ) ∗ ((b = false→ χ = L) −∗ Φ(b, b)))
dwp get classified r1 & get classified r2 {Φ}
DECLASSIFY-SPEC
val dep(τ, r1, r2) class(r1,r2)(χ, q)
(class auth(r1,r2)(χ) ∗ class(r1,r2)(χ, q) ≡−∗ class auth(r1,r2)(L) ∗ class(r1,r2)(L, q) ∗ (class(r1,r2)(L, q) −∗ Φ((), ())))
dwp declassify r1 v1 & declassify r2 v2 {Φ}
CLASSIFY-SPEC
val dep(τ, r1, r2) class(r1,r2)(χ, q) (class auth(r1,r2)(χ) ∗ class(r1,r2)(χ, q) ≡−∗ class auth(r1,r2)(H) ∗ Φ((), ())
dwp classify r1 & classify r2 {Φ}
NEW-VDEP-SPEC
Jτ ⊔ χK(v1, v2) (∀r1 r2. val dep(τ, r1, r2) ∗ class(r1,r2)(χ, 1) −∗ Φ(r1, r2))
dwp new vdep v1 & new vdep v2 {Φ}
Figure 16. HOCAP-style specifications for dynamically classified references.
and progress-sensitive security condition. As we have men-
tioned, if we take termination and timing behavior into ac-
count, the liberal compositional reasoning that is enjoyed by
termination-insensitive type systems is no longer sound. In
presence of higher-order functions and store, we can write the
counterexample from the beginning of this section in the form
of p2 to obtain the program p3 below:
let p3 f g h = r ← f ; s← g;
let x = (if h then r else s) in
(!x)()
The variable x now aliases a reference to a function. If f and
g exhibit different termination behavior, then the value of h
can be observed by invoking !x.
B. Generalized rule for branching
The notion of security that we use (scheduler specific
bisimulations) allows for branching on high-sensitivity data,
provided that the timing behavior of the branches is indistin-
guishable. Due to relational nature of our logic, we can verify
such programs to be secure, even though type systems do not
allow for branching on high-sensitive data. In §V we presented
a structural rule that links together two if-expressions if the
branching is done on a low-sensitivity data. A sound typing
rule for branching on high-sensitivity data is hard to conceive:
if we branch on a high-sensitivity Boolean then it is insufficient
to verify that the each individual branch is secure, we also have
to verify that the two different branches are indistinguishable
for the attacker. This kind of condition is present in the
structural rule LOGREL-IF in Figure 15. We can speak of two
different branches being indistinguishable because we have
moved from a unary typing system to a binary logic.
Recall, that an inference rule is interpreted as an separating
implication, where the premises are joined together by a
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separating conjunction. To prove each premise, the user of
the rule has to distribute the resources they currently have
among the premises. The last four premises in LOGREL-IF,
however, are joined by a regular intuitionistic conjunction (∧).
The user still has to prove both of those premises if they wish
to apply the rule, but this time they do not have to split their
resources, i.e., they are able to reuse the same resource to
prove all the premises. This corresponds to the fact that there
are four possible combinations of branches, but only one of
the combinations can actually occur.
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